Structural coherence is the degree of alignment between a country’s factor endowments and the factor intensity level of the country’s industrial composition. For example, a country that has high capital endowment would be structurally coherent if the country’s industrial composition is dominated by capital-intensive industries; in contrast, if a capital-abundant country has an industrial composition that concentrates on labor-intensive industries, it would be structurally incoherent. My research found that the countries that have higher structural coherence level achieve higher economic growth. For a group of OECD countries, the differences in their structural coherence level explain about 25% of the variations in their economic growth.
Why should policy makers care about this? Because this result suggests that whatever can be done to maintain/increase the structural coherence level of a country would be good for its economy. In this light, government policies, investment decisions and regulatory reforms can be evaluated according to whether they help increase structural coherence or pull the economy away from structural coherence. And if the economy is in trouble, the government can think about what it can do to enhance structural coherence, either by bringing the capital intensity of the industrial composition closer to the existing level of capital endowment, or by changing the capital endowment level to meet the capital intensity of the present industrial composition, depending on which way is less costly. In general, the capital endowment of a country is probably slower and harder to change than the choice of industrial composition, though high capital mobility in today’s globalized world certainly makes it easier. That’s why it makes economic sense for the government to do whatever it can to help the industrial structure match the country’s capital endowment, instead of doing things the other way around. But we probably shouldn't take this as a rigid rule. The bottom line is: whenever there is incoherence, change whichever variable that is easier (less costly) to change.
Now let’s see how this principle can help guide the policy decisions. Let’s say there is a developing country. One day it got a large sum of foreign aid money, and it is supposed to invest the money in productive project(s) that help the country’s long-term growth. The government decides to invest in Project A: to build a factory producing electronic gadgets using the most advanced technology. The factory needs to employ local people to operate the fancy machineries. But since the country is very poor and the majority of its labor force uneducated, the government has to hire foreign experts to come train the local employees so that they become competent enough to handle the machines. Now what the government is doing here is essentially trying to marginally elevate the country’s human capital endowment in order to fit the human-capital intensity of its industrial investment plan. Can it work? Of course. Is it a good idea? Probably not. The government’s intention is a good one—to increase the country’s human capital through the investment project? (And don’t they all say human capital is important for growth?) But such a strategy is so costly to implement given the country’s original endowments that the profit level of Project A may turn out to be too low to make the investment even sustainable.
Now alternatively, the country can use the money to invest in Project B: to expand the country’s basic manufacturing industries, e.g., crafts& furniture, textile, food processing, that employ the country’s abundant manual labor but require relatively little physical and human capital investment; and at the same time to invest in infrastructures like roads and port facilities, which makes it easier for the expanding industries to transport and export their products. What the government does here is to bring the country’s industrial structure to match the country’s endowment fundamentals, by assisting the development of the “coherent” industries and removing the hurdles for these industries’ growth. By coherent industries I mean the industries whose factor intensity is in line with the country’s factor endowments. Since these industries are profitable given the macro fundamentals of the country, they can stand by themselves and generate savings for the country’s future development, which eventually becomes a virtuous cycle. This example is very stylized and the development puzzles in reality are often more nuanced. Each country has its own unique endowment and bottlenecks that need to be overcome. Yet the structural coherence principle as a guideline for policy and investment decision-making should hold in general.
The principle not only applies to the developing countries, but also to advanced economies. Take for example, the recent controversial bailout of several car manufacturers in the US. How do we evaluate the government decision from the structural coherence point of view? We know that the US is a capital-abundant country and also one of the largest recipients of foreign capital inflow in the world. Automobile industry used to be capital intensive, say, thirty years ago. But nowadays, despite the popular perception, car manufacturing has slid down the capital intensity ladder compared to the expanding industries such as pharmaceuticals and communication, (Note: higher fixed set-up cost, as in steel and automobile industries, should not be confused with higher capital intensity, though the two may correlate.) In fact, in the US, even agriculture industry is more capital-intensive than car manufacturing. (These rankings are, to be sure, highly country-specific, as different countries adopt different technologies in the same industry. Most countries’ agricultural sector is far less capital-intensive than that of the US.)
Now this leads to the question: is it a good idea for the government to artificially keep an industry alive that is no longer coherent with the country’s endowment fundamentals? The answer, according to the structural coherence principle, is obviously no. Simply subsidizing the incoherent industries won’t make them sustainable or productive; in the long run, this is a drain on government resources that can be better invested somewhere else. Then the next question is: is it an accurate description of what the US government has actually done? Sounds like so to me. But how about the employees of Detroit? If such a large industry collapsed, where would they go? Shouldn’t the government help them? Sure the government should help. And the government can do it in several ways: (1) hand them cash directly; (2) help them to relocate to profitable industries/thriving geographical areas; (3) provide trainings\continuous education to make them more employable in other jobs. All of these are probably more direct and efficient than trying to keep a dying industry alive. (This is related to the structural unemployment problem in the US right now. But that should be the topic of another article.)
But here is a caveat. Is it ALWAYS a bad idea for the government to prolong the life of an industry that is incoherent with the country’s endowment fundamentals? No, but for the bailout to work, it requires significant changes in the industry itself, which can be improbable in some cases. In other words, the temporary government assistance would only work if the incoherent industry finds ways to change and become coherent again. Following the car industry example, what should the auto makers do to save their own lives? The answer, according to the structural coherence principle, is deceptively simple. It’s not financial restructuring. It’s not negotiating with creditors. It’s not squeezing their suppliers. It is to FIND BETTER WAYS TO MAKE CARS AND MAKE BETTER CARS! Specifically, that means to survive in a capital-abundant country like the US, they need to change their input structure to use more of capital and human capital in the production process, and less of manual labor, which is way more expensive in this country than in its far-East competitors. It also means to reduce the scarce input the cars need themselves to function, in this case petrol fuels, the endowment of which is becoming less and less abundant globally. But both these measures require significant, if not revolutionary, changes in the technology US firms use to make cars. If these changes do not happen and status quo maintained, then any government subsidies will only save these firms temporarily, and more troubles will be coming. So an important question the government should be thinking about when making the bailout decision is: how likely are these changes gonna happen? If the government doesn’t ensure the implementation of these changes, then simply subsidizing the dying industries is a dead-end strategy. But again, how skilled are the governments in general when it comes to monitoring the direction of technological change?
Now I’ve argued that to maintain the structural coherence of the economy, the government should help bring the factor intensities of industrial composition closer to the levels of factor endowments. Are there situations where doing the opposite is advisable, i.e., to bring the levels of factor endowments into alignment with existing industrial structure? It will generally be far more costly, if not impossible, as mentioned earlier. But it can be a good strategy if given the following conditions:
- The underlining industries are already profitable and expanding on their own;
- The industries’ factor intensities are broadly in line with the country’s factor endowment levels, except for maybe one or two factors that is becoming the bottleneck for the industries’ future development;
- It is possible and not overly costly (in terms of both resources and time) to change the endowments in these couple factors.
For example, the growing industries in the US nowadays are generally human capital and intangible capital intensive, industries like pharmaceuticals, computer services, and part of financial services, which require a lot of research and design work and technological supports. Some of these industries are faced with the shortage of domestic talents. Although the US is already human capital abundant, apparently the growth of US human capital is not catching up with the growth of certain industries. As a result, these industries are aggressively hiring immigrants and even from abroad, but it is not always easy due to administrative hurdles. Is it suggestible for the US government to do something to help increase further the human capital endowment of the country, so as to accommodate the need of existing industries? To answer the question we can check if the above three conditions are met. (1) Are these industries already thriving in the US? Yes. (2) Are they generally coherent with the endowment profile of the US? Yes, the US is abundant in physical and intangible capital, and other factors that these industries use heavily. But certain types of human capital are becoming constraining factors. (3) Is it possible and cheap enough to increase the human capital endowment of the US? Of course it is possible. All the government has to do is to change its immigration policy to allow more immigrants with high human capital. So it is doable and cheap in a pure economic sense. But of course, the political cost to the administration is another matter, which is how things often times start to deviate from the optimal state.